Abstract. A scheme that defending against distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks adopts the mechanism of Distribution-based Secure Overlay Nodes (DSON) to a large-scale ISP (Internet Service Provider) network is presented. The scheme uses local BPG announcement to divert traffic to the overlay network when experiencing high load, then filtering algorithm based on the technology of signal processing is applied to the diverted traffic. This algorithm detects and filters out DDoS attacks in frequency domain to allow targets to provide good service to legitimate traffic, with fast reaction and high energy ratio of legitimate to attacks traffic. DSON is implemented and installed on the monitor points of large-scale ISP network associated with the corresponding routers, edge router, border router, and core router, with no requirement for the modifying to network architecture, infrastructure, and protocol.
1

Introduction and Motivation
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is a great threat to the quality of service (QoS) of Internet and large-scale Internet Service Provider (ISP) network [1] . In this paper, a network-based defense mechanism called Distribution-based Secure Overlay Nodes (DSON) is proposed to defend against DDoS attacks in large-scale ISP Networks. Since attacker hosts and victim under flood-type attacks are widely distributed, DSON takes a distributed approach to implement defense functions with the features: (i) secure overlay array nodes are installed at every edge or border router and managed by a management center (MC).
(ii) no requirements of modifying the architecture, infrastructures, protocol, and routing strategy of existing ISP network, no additional routing path needed, and no physic routing link added.
Related Work
There are many network-based mechanisms of handling DDoS problem in large-scale ISP network. Secure overlay Services (SOS) [1] with the goal of routing only authenticated traffic can pass through the overlay network to the target sites, which accepts only packets from the servlets. Traffic that has not been confirmed to originate from a good client is dropped. Clients must use an overlay network, sitting on top of the existing network, to get authentication and reach the servers. Redirection-based defense mechanism [4] is a network-based defense mechanism that reduces the required number of defense nodes based on traffic redirection which allows the edge and border routers to divert suspicious packets to central defense nodes (C-DNs). Such traffic redirection requires an additional forwarding mechanism other than IP-destination-address-based forwarding since suspicious packets must be routed through a C-DN at all times before reaching a final destination. Traffic redirection using tunneling technique to set up tunnels between all the edge and border routers and C-DNs, and the packets destined for a victim are diverted to the CDNs by configuring policy routing of the edge and border routers. D-ward [5] is a source network-based system aiming to detect attacks before or as they leave the network that the DDoS agent resides on. It is an inline system (transparent to the users on the network) that gathers two-way traffic statistics from the border router at the source network and compares them to network traffic models built upon application and transport protocol specifications, reflecting normal (legitimate), transient (suspicious), and attack behavior [6] . D-ward is a self-regulating reverse-feedback system collaborating with source router. The throttling component of D-ward generates and adjusts rate limit rules, then communicates them to the source router, which filters the attack traffic. In general, approaches mentioned above depend on modifying the routing configuration policy and adding intelligent algorithm to routers. It is very difficult for a well-design and end-constructed existing large-scale ISP network to do these changes, which may degrade the network QoS, and bring other unexpected problems.
D-SON-based DDoS defense mechanism
China Education & Research Network (CERNET) is a national-wide academic network platform. With more and more computers connected to CERNET, system security must be kept up with the increase in connectivity. Many secure measures have been implemented on CERNET with its scale expend. 42 monitor points (MPs) have been designed and installed on distributed 42 region and main network nodes to monitor, detect, and control the outgoing and incoming traffic. D-SON is considered as the defense mechanism for CERNET to defend against floodtype attacks based on the experiences of handling DDoS attacks event, and analyzing flow connection and traffic data [4] . We assume all attack traffic is generated by some organized hosts on peer customer networks, or generated from other locations on the Internet and then routed over via neighboring ISPs. CERNET is an autonomous system (AS) constructed by inter-connected core routers forming the backbone network. The sub-networks are connecting to CERNET through border routers or access routers, while the other ISP networks connecting the CERNET through edge routers. The task for CERNET defending against DDoS attack focuses on two aspects: (iv) Three attack paths Two defense points are designed for every attack path, one source-end and one victim-end. Each attack path is denoted in two lines, the solid is the real attack path, the while dashed is the path through defense points. D . Note that in practical application of large ISP networks, the attack targets and sources are changeable, resulting in the change of attack path. In this case, each defense point has the function of both source-end and victim-end defense. The differences between DSON and redirection-based defense mechanism are that: (i) Redirection modifies router configuration to change the routing policy, while DSON uses diverting algorithm to change the traffic normal path. (ii) Redirection uses Manager Node (MGR) to reconfigure the routing policy of edge and border router, while DSON adopts MC to manage the distributed SONs. The distinguished difference between DSON and D-ward is the executor for traffic limiting. The former is SON, the latter is router. D-ward has the function of traffic observation and rulebased traffic limiting, while SON not only monitors the traffic, also has the ability to remove malicious packets.
Design of SON
SON working together with an associated router as Riverhead [8] . If a DDoS attack is detected, all traffic destined to the target (protected and attacked) is then diverted off normal path through the SON, which applies filtering rule (algorithm) and judges guide-line to identify and eliminate malicious packets, allowing legitimate transactions to pass. Traffic to target is diverted to SON, which works in two operation modes depending on its two main functions: (i) Defend: SON actively filters out attack traffic and forwards legitimate traffic to the target. 
Key technologies of SON
In statistic mode, traffic is diverted through the DSON so it could learn the normal behavior of different connections and clients to establish a baseline profile. Once the profile is built, the operator interacts with the DSON and may adjust or accept any of the suggested parameters.
(i) Traffic divert When an attack has been detected, diversion is achieved by the SON sending out an iBGP announcement, the traffic should be routed to the Label Switching Protocol (LSP) path that ends at the SON's loop-back interface. To ensure that the BGP announcements will not propagate into all the backbone routers' routing tables, noadvertise and no-export BGP is applied on the community strings. As a result, only associated router will receive the BGP announcements about the target, with next hop to the corresponding SON loop-back interface [8] .
(2) Detection approach The detection of DDoS attacks adopts the technology of signal processing based on the frequency-domain characteristics from the autocorrelation sequence of Internet traffic streams [9] . The arrivals of network packet are expressed in a packet process:
{ } ( ), , X t t n n N = Δ ∈ , where Δ is the constant interval. N is number of packet. X(t) represents the total number of packet arrivals at one router in ( , ] t t − Δ
[10] [11] . Take a single TCP flow plus one constant rate UDP flow with a rate of 300Kb/sec as the attack flow (Figure 2) . The attack flow is destined to the target together with normal traffic. In this case, Δ =5ms.
In order to detect the attack flow from the normal flow, the packet arrivals are converted into frequency domain by adopting Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT):
Where, k＝0,1,2……N-1. Equation (1) generates the amplitude spectrum of packets arrivals (Figure 3) . Figure. 5. Calculate the energy of TCP flow and UDP attack individually; the energy ratio of TCP to UDP is noted as ERTU. Test result shows the ERTU increases about 10dB (Table 2) . 
Performance test with CERNET data
The test of DSON performance is conducted by using the data that collected for CERNET.
(1) Flood-type DDoS attack to CERNET Reports from CERNET NOC and CERNET Computer Emergency Response Team (CCERT) show that many mission-critical web sites of CERNET experienced many times flood-type DDoS attacks. Traffic Accounting record of CERNET show that a DDoS attack happened from AM 6:25 to 8:15, July 14, 2005, congestion in the rush hour is so serious (max traffic up to 453,667kpps) that lead to a lot of packets (Legitimate and attack) dropped, the traffic accounting of inbound and outbound descended shapely. Obviously, this attack causes big economy loss to CERNET [7] , because this attack leads to a wrong traffic account.
At PM 1:10, Mar. 28, 2005, monitor center of CERNET record the detail information about one important Web page server of CERNET suffer from TCP SYN flood attack. This attack directs about 100 of compromised zombie hosts, all IP are spoofed. It adopts TCP protocol, average packets length is 60 Bytes [7] . Table 3 shows the records for 4 zombie hosts (in shorten, only list 4 of 100 zombie hosts' records). Table. 4 is the analysis result to one zombie host. For privacy purpose, the destination (target) IP and source IP is omitted. These data of attack traffic are collected and stored in disc array storage for future testing of DSON performance. Note: Percent in bandwidth means every attack TCP link occupies in total practical bandwidth 857.9 Mbps, and percent in packets expresses the packets of every attack TCP link sending occupies in total practical packets 359390. (2) Defending against DDoS attack test Every SON assigns an IP address. The management information of communication between SON and MC adopts the TCP/IP protocol. The former executing as a detector and the latter acting as a controller of the flood-type DDoS attack. MP detects the traffic destined to a certain network that are exceed "normal" levels, then SON examines the traffic of different port numbers, and/or different sources in order to detect the offending source or the characteristic port number. Experiment environment for testing the performance of DSON scheme is built by connecting to CERNET and TUNET (Tsinghua University Campus Network) as Figure 6 . (Table 5 ) from the output of ser 8 shows that the SON has a good performance in filtering attack packets. Statistics to the experiment result shows ( Table 6 ) that the average ratio of legitimate traffic passing is more than 92%, legitimate traffic dropping is less than 8%, attack traffic filtering is more than 98.5%, and attack traffic passing is less than 1.5%. 
Conclusion
In this paper, a distribution-based defense mechanism against flood-type attacks is proposed for protecting the targeted sub-networks and mission-critical Web sites of CERNT. For a well-constructed large-scale ISP networks, any small modification to the routing policy and network devices will lead to big troubles. Based on the principle of no requirements of modification to the topology and protocol of existing large-scale ISP networks, this ISP level mechanism using DSON to divert the traffic with suspicious packets to the SONs by sending a BGP announcement to the associated edge or border routers. Then, a filtering algorithm in frequency domain is applied to filter out attacks. We will further study how to improve the accuracy of the malicious packet search process, develop the IP trace-back system to catch attacking source sites against a variety of attacks, and protect large-scale ISP network from vicious attacks to ensure business continuity.
